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ABSTRACT 
We document using the ZEW panel of German stock market forecasters that weak 
forecasters tend to be overconfident in the sense that they provide extreme forecasts 
and their confidence intervals are less likely to contain eventual realizations.  Moderate 
filters based on forecast accuracy over short rolling windows are somewhat successful 
in improving predictability.  While poor performance can be due to various factors, a 
filter based on a prior tendency to provide extreme forecasts also improves 
predictability.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Abundant research has documented the pitfalls of overconfidence in financial decision-
making.  For example, investors so affected are likely to trade too much (e.g., Barber 
and Odean (2000)) and under-diversify (Goetzmann and Kumar (2008)), while 
susceptible managers are prone to excessive M&A activity (Malmendier and Tate 
(2008)) and market entry (Camerer and Lovallo (1999)).  Daniel Kahneman, in his recent 
bestseller Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), argues that professional forecasters are often 
bested by simple algorithms because they “try to be too clever, think outside the box, 
and consider complex combinations of features in making their predictions (p. 224).” 
This is another way of saying that they are overconfident: they believe they know more 
than they actually do. 
 
While forecast disagreement can occur because of heterogeneity in information, 
information-updating frequency and model choice (Capistran and Timmermann 
(2009a)), behavioral bias might also contribute. The purpose of this paper is to explore 
the impact of overconfidence on forecasting stock market returns in the context of 
surveys of professional forecasters. The questions we ask ourselves are these. Does 
overconfidence weaken forecast accuracy?  And, given that there is heterogeneity in 
performance in part induced by heterogeneity in overconfidence, is there a payoff to 
filtering out weaker forecasters to improve survey accuracy, where weakness is based 
either on past performance or the tendency to exhibit markers of overconfidence? 
 
Excess market returns have proved to be notoriously difficult to predict out of sample.  
While there is an extensive literature documenting return predictability within sample 
using such fundamental variables as dividend yields, interest rates and term spreads, as 
pointed out by Goyal and Welch (2008), this has not translated into out-of-sample 
performance as (typically) measured by out-of-sample R2 (OS-R2) relative to a naïve 
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benchmark such as the historical average equity premium. 1  Nevertheless Rapach, 
Strauss and Zhou (2010) have shown that a combination forecast methodology whereby 
several predictive variables are optimally combined can lead to a modicum of out-of-
sample success. The same holds in Ferreira and Santa-Clara (2011) where the 
components of stock market returns are predicted separately. Nevertheless 
predictability is modest, in the former case being less than 4% (using quarterly data) 
and in the latter case less than 2% (using monthly). 
 
While it is logical to expect that panels of professional forecasters, not only with such 
predictive variables at their disposal but also armed with experiential judgment, should 
easily be able to outperform naïve benchmarks, the Kahneman perspective encourages 
skepticism in this regard. Take the ZEW survey in Germany, which since February 2003 
has solicited point forecasts for the DAX.2  While the mean forecast of the excess market 
return coming from this survey produces OS-R2 of 6.19% (with p-value=0.073) for 
March 2003-June 2010, success is concentrated in the first year as OS-R2 = 1.09% (p-
value=0.239) during February 2004-June 2010.3  
 
Some forecasters are weaker than others and these may skew the consensus. We 
conjecture that weak forecasters may be weak in part because they are more 
overconfident than other forecasters. One possibility is that, relying too much on 
intuition, they have a tendency to make extreme forecasts. Denrell and Fang (2010) 
document that those who have made a very accurate recent prediction – since markets 
are volatile this often implies an extreme prediction – are likely to be inferior forecasters 
going forward.  Indeed our data indicate that survey respondents with higher forecast 
standard deviations have higher mean squared prediction errors (MSPEs).  
1 See Neely, Rapach, Tu and Zhou (2010) for many references on return predictability. 
2 The DAX is an index composed of the 30 largest and most important German companies traded on the 
German Stock Exchange in Frankfurt. 
3 The ZEW survey actually requests six-month DAX forecasts.  The reported OS-R2s are based on imputed 
one-month forecasts (as described below) so (given this imputation) the February 2003 survey solicits 
forecasts for March 2003. 
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Overconfidence can also manifest itself in the tendency to be too sure of one’s views, 
leading to overly narrow confidence intervals.4  This tendency is echoed in the model of 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), where overconfident investors put too 
much stock in private information and exert pressure on prices in the direction of their 
information, with the result that if such investors dominate markets overreaction and 
eventual reversal in security prices can ensue.  We further document that forecasters 
whose confidence intervals are wide enough to contain the eventual DAX realization 
more often than other forecasters are better forecasters in the sense that they have lower 
MSPEs.  This is not tautological because better forecasters actually have narrower 
confidence bounds. 
   
Next consensus forecast improvement is considered.  We show that filtering out from 
the survey inferior forecasters can lead to modest but statistically significant 
improvements in accuracy.  For example, if we drop the 30% of forecasters whose prior 
MSPEs over the preceding three forecasts was highest, OS-R2 reaches 4.18%, which is 
significant at 2%.  It is not obvious that this should be so since one might expect that 
inferior forecasts would be as likely to be too high (relative to the realization) as too 
low.  Evidently, some error clustering is occurring, consistent with what has been found 
for analysts (Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003)).  We also document that there is a payoff to 
dropping forecasters without regard to past performance but who exhibit one marker of 
overconfidence, namely the tendency to make extreme forecasts.  For example, if we 
drop the 70% of forecasters whose prior forecast volatility is highest over the preceding 
12 months, OS-R2 reaches 4.43%, which is significant at 3%.       
 
In what follows, we begin by providing appropriate background on the ZEW DAX 
survey. In section 3 we explore the characteristics of successful forecasters and the 
contributing role of overconfidence. In the penultimate section, we document that 
4  Deaves, Lüders and Schröder (2010) have previously documented that the ZEW forecasters are 
overconfident in this sense.  Ben-David, Graham and Harvey (2013) have performed a similar exercise 
using a U.S. panel of market forecasts.  
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filtering out weaker forecasters can lead to meaningful out-of-sample predictability.  
Finally, in section 5, we discuss our findings and sum up.   
 
2. ZEW survey 
 
The ZEW Finanzmarkttest is a monthly survey of over 300 private sector forecasters in 
Germany.  From 1991 to the present it has solicited predicted directional changes 
(rise/fall/unchanged) in a series of key macroeconomic and financial market variables 
for the key industrialized economies as of six months in the future. 5   Starting in 
February 2003, ZEW survey respondents were also asked to provide quantitative 
forecasts and confidence intervals for the DAX.  Specifically, point estimates for the 
DAX six months in the future, as well as lower and upper bounds forming 90% 
confidence intervals began to be solicited.  These are the forecasts that we investigate 
here. 6   The cleaned dataset has over 20,000 forecaster-survey observations, with a 
survey minimum/mean/maximum of 135/228/269.       
 
To avoid the overlapping data problem inherent in the fact that forecasts are made 
monthly for six-month-ahead DAX levels, we here follow the methodology of Deaves, 
Lüders and Schröder (2010), where one-month point forecasts and 90% confidence 
intervals are imputed from six-month. It is assumed that forecasters believe that the 
growth rate in the DAX will be constant over the next six months.  More specifically, 
letting L6, F6 and U6 be the six-month interval lower bound, forecast point estimate and 
interval upper bound respectively, the one-month forecast point estimate (F1) is 
calculated as: 
 
5  Most of these individuals work for a commercial bank, investment bank, insurance company or 
investment department of a large German company.  For example, participants are asked to predict the 
inflation rate, long-term and short-term interest rates, economic activity, and stock market levels for these 
countries.   
6 The final survey in our dataset is May 2010. 
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(1)   𝐹𝐹1 = ( 𝐹𝐹6𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷0)1/6 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷0, 
 
where DAX0 is the (respondent-specific) current level of the DAX.  On the assumption 
of i.i.d. DAX one-month returns, the standard deviation of one-month returns is 1/√6 
times the six-month standard deviation.  Confidence intervals are chosen to reflect what 
is believed to be the correct number of standard deviations on each side of the point 
estimate, as follows:  
(2)   𝑈𝑈1 = 𝐹𝐹1 ∗ �𝑈𝑈6𝐹𝐹6� 1√6, 
(3)   𝐿𝐿1 = 𝐹𝐹1 ∗ �𝐿𝐿6𝐹𝐹6� 1√6. 
Respondents typically are given several weeks to make their forecasts, with first 
solicitation occurring usually near the end of the preceding month.  For example, for the 
September 2004 survey the first received response was on August 28, and the last on 
September 14.  For these reasons, equations (1)-(3) require adjustment.  Since they are 
not told to do otherwise, logically respondents would be making their forecasts for 
exactly six months in the future.  If we use these equations without adjustment, 
respondents’ imputed one-month forecasts (and intervals) would be for different DAX 
dates and thus would not be comparable. The way to obviate this problem is to use a 
respondent-specific imputation that doesn’t generate a one-month ahead forecast (and 
interval) but rather yields a one-month-ahead-of-the-end-of-forecast-month forecast 
(and interval), as follows: 
 (1𝑎𝑎)   𝐹𝐹1𝑎𝑎 = ( 𝐹𝐹6𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷0)(30+𝑑𝑑)/180 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷0, 
(2𝑎𝑎)   𝑈𝑈1𝑎𝑎 = 𝐹𝐹1𝑎𝑎 ∗ �𝑈𝑈6𝐹𝐹6��30+𝑑𝑑180 , 
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(3𝑎𝑎)   𝐿𝐿1𝑎𝑎 = 𝐹𝐹1𝑎𝑎 ∗ �𝐿𝐿6𝐹𝐹6��30+𝑑𝑑180 , 
 
where d is the number of days from forecast receipt to the end of the forecast month.  
Averaging subsets of these imputed forecasts provides the ZEW consensus forecasts that 
are investigated here. 
 
3. Characteristics of successful forecasters  
 
In this section we explore the characteristics of successful forecasters, where forecast 
success is calculated using MSPE. Certain of the variables considered are logical ex ante 
markers of superior performance, while others are potentially linked to overconfidence.  
Table 1 summarizes our expectations.   
 
Beginning with logical ex ante markers of superior performance, as described in section 
2, forecasts are made at different times. Those made later, when more information is 
likely to be available, would be expected to be better forecasts. Cross-sectionally, 
individuals tend to have different survey response habits, with some tending to forecast 
early and others doing so towards the end of the survey month.  STALENESS_MEAN,  
which is defined as the average number of days prior to the end of the survey month 
the forecaster in question submits her forecast, captures this.  The expectation is that 
those contributing early and thus having higher STALENESS_MEAN will tend to have 
higher MSPE. 
 
Second, forecasters submit not only point forecasts (which are used to assess MSPE) but 
also 90% confidence intervals surrounding their point forecasts. Logically those who 
feel they have a better sense of where the DAX is going should submit narrower 
confidence intervals. Thus average (scaled) confidence interval width 
(CONF_INT_MEAN), defined as (U6-L6)/DAX0, provides information on confidence.  
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Importantly, this is not the same as overconfidence, which requires a comparison of 
perceived and revealed ability. The expectation is that those with lower 
CONF_INT_MEAN will tend to have lower MSPE. Of course it is possible that their 
confidence is entirely unfounded, in which case there will be no impact. 
 
Third, the tendency to produce extreme forecasts thereby relying to a great extent on 
one’s own intuition points in the direction of overconfidence. Consistent with Denrell 
and Fang (2010), the expectation is that those whose forecasts tend to be more variable 
(i.e., have a higher standard deviation (SD)) will be weaker forecasters. Such a 
relationship is far from obvious, since, given the volatility that exists in stock indexes, a 
“perfect foresight” forecaster will have extremely variable forecasts.  It is expected that 
SD and MSPE are positively related. 
 
Finally, frequent submission is likely to be a signal of attention. On the other hand, 
consistent with the inattention model of Peng and Xiong (2006), those participating 
sporadically are signaling inattention and perhaps a reduced ability to see where 
markets are moving. We define EXPERIENCE as the overall number of forecasts 
submitted during the sample, with the expectation that higher EXPERIENCE is 
associated with lower MSPE. Diminishing returns seem likely: logically going from 10 
forecasts to 20 is a stronger incremental signal of interest than going from 50 to 60, since 
everyone responding 50 times or more is exhibiting commitment. For these reasons we 
perform not only regressions with EXPERIENCE but also those including a squared 
term (EXPERIENCE_2), with the expectation that the coefficient on the latter should be 
positive to reflect convexity vs. MSPE. 
 
Table 2 reveals whether the data conform to expectations.7  Its four panels differ in the 
minimum number of forecasts that a forecaster must submit in order to remain in the 
7 In unreported results, a version of Table 2 that excludes 2007-08, a tumultuous period in financial 
markets, is broadly similar to what is reported here. 
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sample, with minima ranging from n=5 to n=30.  While each panel displays three 
regressions, initially we focus on the first two, with the first positing a linear 
relationship for EXPERIENCE, and the second by including a squared term allowing for 
diminishing returns.  Turning to regression (2) in Panel B (where forecasters are only 
included if they have made at least 10 forecasts over the full sample and non-linearity in 
EXPERIENCE is allowed for), we see the coefficients line up exactly as anticipated, with 
all variables being of the anticipated sign and statistically significant at 1% or very close 
to it.  Regression (1) from the same panel is comparable, with a reduced significance 
level for EXPERIENCE because linearity is imposed.   
 
The other panels can be thought of as robustness checks. STALENESS_MEAN, 
CONF_INT_MEAN, and the overconfidence marker SD are extremely robust, with all 
other coefficients indicating significance in the anticipated direction at 10% or better.  
As for EXPERIENCE, both the unsquared and squared terms become insignificant for 
n=30, which should perhaps not be surprising because given non-linearity most of the 
meaningful impact of EXPERIENCE comes for more moderate EXPERIENCE levels. 
 
As a further robustness check, we re-estimate regression (2) by replacing 
CONF_INT_MEAN with average relative imputed individual volatility, or 
RELATIVE_IMPUTED_IND_VOL_MEAN.  The latter variable begins with 
IMPUTED_IND_VOL, namely the conversion of respondents’ confidence intervals into 
individual volatility estimates by using the Davidson and Cooper (1976) method to 
recover respondent-specific probability distributions under normality:8   
 (4)     𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 = (𝑈𝑈1𝑎𝑎 − 𝐿𝐿1𝑎𝑎)3.2 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷0 . 
 
8 See Pearson and Tukey (1965), Moder and Rodgers (1968), and Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2013).  
Equation (4) is based on the fact that respondents’ confident intervals are 90%.   
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This variable is calculated for each forecaster in every survey month.  We then 
standardize relative to all forecasters participating in the same survey month.  Finally, 
we calculate for all forecasters the average across all months for which there was 
participation.  Regression (3) appears in the third column.  Consistent with regression 
(2), survey respondents with higher average relative imputed individual volatilities 
have higher MSPEs.   
 
The miscalibration-based variant of overconfidence, which exists when x% confidence 
intervals (subject to sampling error) contain fewer than x% correct answers, can be 
directly calculated from the data. Using the first two years of the ZEW forecasts, 
Deaves, Lüders and Schröder (2010) found that the average forecaster in this dataset 
was egregiously overconfident in this sense, but, consistent with learning, they adjusted 
their confidence interval widths depending on past success. Here we take a different 
perspective.  If overconfidence gets in the way of judicious forecasting, then we would 
expect more overconfident forecasters to have higher MSPEs. Letting 
HIT_PERCENTAGE be defined as the percentage of the time one’s (imputed) one-
month confidence interval contains the eventual value of the DAX, with lower values 
indicating higher overconfidence, according to this argument HIT_PERCENTAGE 
should be negatively related to MSPE. 
 
While on the surface it might appear viable to introduce HIT_PERCENTAGE as an 
additional explanatory variable in the MSPE regressions, there is a problem in doing so. 
Once we control for the average confidence width (CONF_INT_MEAN), 
HIT_PERCENTAGE will by construction be negatively related to MSPE.  This is because 
holding constant interval width a successful forecaster will almost certainly have more 
“hits” than an unsuccessful one. Matters are quite different however if we relate 
HIT_PERCENTAGE to MSPE without controlling for CONF_INT_MEAN.  It is helpful to 
roughly partition overconfidence as follows: 
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(5)   𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼 = 𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑂𝑂𝑁𝑁 − 𝐷𝐷𝑂𝑂𝐼𝐼𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿 𝐾𝐾𝑁𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐾𝐾𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐷𝐷𝐾𝐾𝐼𝐼. 
 
Overconfidence exists when one’s perception of knowledge (i.e., one’s confidence) 
exceeds one’s actual knowledge.  More precisely, an increase in KNOWLEDGE 
PERCEPTION (in the present context, confidence interval shrinkage) reflects ceteris 
paribus higher overconfidence, while an increase in ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE (in the 
present context, lower MSPE) reflects ceteris paribus lower overconfidence.  Since the 
regression results show that confidence interval width and MSPE are positively related 
(i.e., low-MSPE forecasters not only have high perceptions of their knowledge but also 
high levels of actual knowledge), the relationship between overconfidence (i.e., lower 
HIT_PERCENTAGE) and revealed MSPE is an open question.  We conjecture a negative 
relationship between overconfidence and forecast performance (revealed MSPE), which 
is logical if the tendency to be overly certain of one’s view induces one to economize on 
effort.   
   
To test this conjecture, terciles based on MSPEs are formed.  These terciles are 
designated as ‘High,’ ‘Medium,’ and ‘Low’ based on MSPEs, with the High group 
containing the highest-MSPE forecasters and the Low group containing the lowest-
MSPE forecasters.  For each tercile, in Table3 HIT_PERCENTAGEs are calculated for the 
same four cross-sectional samples as in Table 2.  Further, the last column shows a t-test 
for the difference in means between the extreme groups.  If overconfident forecasters 
tend to make weak forecasts, then this would imply that High forecasters will have a 
lower HIT_PERCENTAGE than Low forecasters.  There is evidence to this effect.  In all 
four cases, Low has a higher average HIT_PERCENTAGE than does High.  When there 
are at least 5-20 survey responses, the difference is statistically significant at 10% or 
better.      
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4. Filtering the ZEW survey 
 
There are compelling reasons to pool forecasts (Timmermann (2009)).  For example, if 
different forecasts use non-matching sources of information, efficient information 
aggregation may result.  And diverse forecasting techniques may be affected differently 
by structural breaks.  While in theory weighting individual forecasts is appealing, a 
simple equal-weighted approach often dominates because of parameter estimation 
error.  Moreover, more subtle techniques such as least squares estimation of weights are 
difficult to operationalize with an unbalanced panel such as the one studied here 
(Capistran and Timmermann (2009b)).  Trimming or filtering out poor forecasters (or 
models) who mostly contribute noise has been shown to improve forecast combinations 
(e.g., Aiolfi and Favero (2005)).9 
 
Here we consider the mean ZEW DAX forecast either with or without filtering based on 
prior performance.10  The purpose is to investigate whether elimination of some of the 
weaker forecasters improves forecast combination accuracy.  While we later document 
that one factor driving inferiority is overconfidence, for now the focus is merely on 
unconditional performance.  In order to generate out-of-sample forecasts it is important 
that filtering be based on known information.  Specifically we eliminate the z% of 
forecasters whose prior MSPEs fall in the bottom z% of all forecasters participating in a 
given month.  We consider increments of 10% (10-90%) along with 95%, 99% and “All 
but best.”   The latter means that only the forecaster with the lowest prior MSPE is 
kept.11 
 
When utilizing past information, the two choices are a recursive or rolling window.12   
9 Though unexplored here, further improvement may also arise by combining survey data with time 
series models (Pesaran and Weale (2006)). 
10 All results presented here are little affected by using the median instead of the mean. 
11 For the 99% filter, typically two forecasters remain, though with ties the number can reach seven. 
12 Note that we say “window” we mean the number of monthly forecasts that we look back at to assess 
performance prior to the forecast in question.  Thus this forecast is not included in the window. 
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In the former case, all previous data are conditioned on while in the latter a constant-
length window is maintained.  The advantage of the former is that all information is 
used, but the disadvantage is some of this information might be so stale that it is best 
ignored.  For example, suppose there are two ways to forecast the DAX, one primarily 
technical and the other primarily fundamental, with some forecasters employing the 
first approach and others the second.13  Further suppose that the return generating 
function for the DAX is regime-dependent.  Under the first regime, a technical approach 
would generate better forecasts, while under the second regime a fundamental 
approach would outperform.  The problem with using a recursive approach is that it is 
less sensitive to the current regime since it could well be the case that a forecaster looks 
good because her technique performed well early in the sample when one regime was 
in place but her recent performance has been weaker now that a second regime is in 
effect.  By varying the length of the rolling window one can get a sense of the optimal 
amount of past data to condition on.  In truth, however, such a comparison is going to 
have an in-sample flavor, as there is no guarantee that this optimal window length will 
continue to be optimal going forward. 
 
To evaluate the out-of-sample performance of the ZEW mean equity premium forecast, 
we calculate OS-R2, after Campbell and Thompson (2008).  This calculation requires a 
forecast methodology against which the ZEW forecast is compared.  The simplest 
benchmark is the mean realized equity premium.  Against such a benchmark, OS-R2 is 
calculated as follows: 
 
(6) 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 = 1 − ∑ �𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚+𝑘𝑘 − ?̂?𝑟𝑚𝑚+𝑘𝑘𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑊𝑊𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�2𝑞𝑞𝑘𝑘=𝑞𝑞0+1
∑ �𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚+𝑘𝑘 − ?̅?𝑟𝑚𝑚+𝑘𝑘
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�
2𝑞𝑞
𝑘𝑘=𝑞𝑞0+1
, 
 
where m is the number of in-sample observations; q is number of out-of-sample 
13 Dick and Menkhoff (2013) use this categorization in investigating ZEW exchange rate forecasts. 
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observations; 𝑞𝑞0 is the initial out-of-sample forecast of the equity premium; 𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚+𝑘𝑘 is the 
realized equity premium at m+k in the out-of-sample period; ?̂?𝑟𝑚𝑚+𝑘𝑘𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑊𝑊_𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀  is the ZEW 
mean out-of-sample equity premium forecast at m+k; and ?̅?𝑟𝑚𝑚+𝑘𝑘𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡_𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀  is the historical 
mean equity premium calculated using data up to m+k.  Note that 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2  gauges the 
proportional reduction in MSPE for the ZEW mean forecast relative to the benchmark.14   
 
When 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 > 0, the ZEW forecast on average outperforms the historical mean forecast 
according to the MSPE metric.15  Based on Clark and West (2007), the null hypothesis 
that 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 ≤ 0  is tested against the alternative hypothesis that 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂2 > 0 in two steps. First, 
define the MSPE-adjusted statistic as follows: 
 (7)𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡+1 = �𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡+1 − ?̅?𝑟𝑡𝑡+1𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡_𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�2 − ��𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡+1 − ?̂?𝑟𝑡𝑡+1𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑊𝑊_𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�2 − �?̅?𝑟𝑡𝑡+1𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑡𝑡_𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 − ?̂?𝑟𝑡𝑡+1𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑊𝑊_𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�2�. 
 
Second, regress {𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻+1}𝐻𝐻=𝑚𝑚+𝑞𝑞0𝑇𝑇−1 on a constant.  And, finally, calculate the t-statistic of this 
constant.  A p-value for a one-sided (upper-tail) test is then obtained with the standard 
normal distribution.  
 
Figure 1 displays both OS-R2s and corresponding p-values for one-, two- and three-year 
recursive windows. Specifically, in the (say) two-year case, for possible inclusion in the 
consensus respondents are ranked based on MSPE over the first 24 surveys and if they 
are in the lowest z% they remain in the sample for the 25th survey.  Moving forward one 
period, to form the 26th survey consensus, the holdout sample is based on the first 25 
forecasts, and so on.  Note that to be considered for inclusion we impose the screen that 
at least 10 forecasts must have been made by a forecaster during the holdout window 
(i.e., prior to the forecast to be evaluated).  It can be observed in Figure 1 that while 
14 The benchmark forecast is the historical average of monthly excess returns. It is the historical mean 
taken over all available excess returns at each point of time for recursive windows. For rolling windows, 
the historical mean benchmark is computed over a corresponding fixed window size.   
15 Throughout this paper, monthly rate of 3-month Frankfurt Interbank Offered Rate (FIBOR3M) is used 
as the risk-free rate to calculate the mean one-month-ahead forecast of the excess market return. 
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filtering improves matters somewhat the OS-R2 is never significant even at 10%.16  
Evidently, there is little obvious value added in using a recursive approach.17 
 
In Figure 2 the same one-, two- and three-year windows as in Figure 1 are utilized, this 
time though using a rolling methodology.  Again, we employ the screen that at least 10 
forecasts over the rolling window must have been made.  The first evaluated forecast is 
done in an identical fashion to the recursive approach, but moving forward the window 
size is kept constant, implying that early observations are ignored in forecast 
evaluation.  Again, in all cases at least 10 observations over the preceding one, two or 
three years are required in order to be considered for inclusion.  A rolling one-year 
approach reveals some improvement vs. no filtering with OS-R2s for 30-50% filters 
ranging from 2.66-3.38% with p-values at 10% or better.  The superiority of a one-year 
vs. two- and three-year windows suggests that it is best to limit the window length so 
that forecasting success in the more distant past is ignored.     
 
Figure 3 investigates how narrow the window should be in order to maximize 
combination forecast improvement. Four approaches are displayed. The first 
(Min_10_for_12) repeats the rolling one-year window used in Figure 2 as a point of 
departure.  The other three filters employ rolling windows of six months (Min_5_for_6), 
three months (Min_2_for_3) and one month (Min_1_for_1).  It is also necessary to 
specify a minimum number of prior forecasts in the rolling window (again noting that 
the window does not include the forecast under consideration).  For six months/three 
months/one month, the minimum is five/two/one.  To interpret the Min_1_for_1 case, 
included forecasters must participate in two consecutive surveys, the one whose success 
is being examined as well as the one immediately preceding (where past success is 
based on how close the latter forecast was to the eventual DAX). 
16 As it were, there are two filters.  The first, which to avoid confusion we call a screen, requires a 
sufficiently long track record so that past performance can be assessed, and the second drops people 
based on poor past performance. 
17 Note that even the 0% filter is based on the “minimum of 10” restriction.  
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Beginning with Min_1_for_1, the highest OS-R2 observed in Figure 3 (6.75%, p-
value=0.063) is without filtering.  Thus, exclusion of forecasters is not helpful: in fact it 
worsens matters, and for filters of 70% or more it is very much counterproductive.  This 
should not be surprising since a track record of a single previous forecast (beyond the 
one under examination) is naturally rife with noise, and is clearly subject to the Denrell 
and Fang (2010) extreme-forecast success critique.  Nevertheless it should be noted that 
there is a marginal gain from attention due to the fact that only those forecasters 
participating twice in a row are considered.  The reference point in this regard is an OS-
R2 of 6.19% (p-value = 0.073), which applies to the case when we only assess the mean 
forecast without any past history requirement.         
 
As for the other two (new) cases in Figure 3, filtering improves matters for both the 
rather short 6-month and 3-month rolling windows. For example, for the very narrow 
three-month window (where we insist that a forecaster was active for the majority (i.e., 
2 of 3) of prior forecasts), the OS-R2s range from 3.35-4.18% for 10-50% filters.  These 
values are statistically significant at the 5% level when compared to the historical mean. 
 
Related to Figure 3 is Figure 4.  Figure 4 ascertains the success of filtering, utilizing the 
same four approaches, but now the unfiltered mean forecast (rather than the historical 
mean) is the benchmark against which we compare filtered mean forecasts (which is 
why we begin at 10%).  Broadly speaking, filtering out inferior forecasters is somewhat 
helpful, with a moderate amount of filtering producing the best results.  Again, for the 
Min_2_for_3 case, the OS-R2 (vs. no filtering) at a 10% filter is 1.45% with a p-value of 
0.090.18    
18 For the Min_5_for_6 case, the OS-R2 (vs. no filtering) at a 20% filter is 2.11% with a p-value of 0.087.  For 
the Min_10_for_12 case, the OS-R2 (vs. no filtering) at a 10% filter is 1.50% with a p-value of 0.078.  For 
brevity, we do not provide the “vs. 0% filter” analogous (to Figures 1 and 2) charts.  In a nutshell 10% 
filtering is effective (at 10% or close to it) for the three recursive approaches.  On the other hand, filtering 
does not pay off for the 24-month and 36-month rolling windows.  
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Next we investigate whether those weaker forecasters who are filtered out are dropped 
in part because of their overconfidence.  Turning to Table 4, which employs the screen 
that a forecaster for potential inclusion must have made at least five forecasts over the 
previous six months, we provide the average levels (both mean and median) of relevant 
variables for three groups of forecasters, designated as ‘Most,’ ‘Between’ and ‘Least,’ 
based on the percentage of the time that a forecaster is filtered out over the sample 
period (where the Most group contains individuals who are filtered out the most and 
the Least group contains individuals who are filtered out the least).  Focusing on 
variables from Table 2, it is salient that forecasters with narrow forecast intervals – 
recall such forecasters are signaling confidence – are less likely to be filtered out.  Further, 
one indicator of overconfidence, the standard deviation of point estimates, is also 
positively associated with a reduced likelihood to be included in the survey.  While 
Table 2 suggests that overconfident forecasters (in the sense that they release extreme 
forecasts) are weak forecasters (i.e., they have higher MSPEs), Table 4 suggests that 
those forecasters who are often filtered out based on prior MSPEs also turn out to be 
overconfident forecasters (in the sense that their forecasts are too extreme). 
   
Apart from academic interest, what if were considering hiring various individuals in a 
forecasting capacity, but while we had no track record of their forecasting performance 
we did possess proxies (perhaps obtained through the administration of a 
questionnaire) for various manifestations of overconfidence.  The results presented here 
impel us to think twice before retaining applicant forecasters who reveal themselves to 
be overconfident. 
 
Corroboration of this view exists in Figure 5, where forecasters are filtered out not 
because of previous forecasting performance but because of prior point forecast 
standard deviation.  It is apparent that there is a payoff to filtering out forecasters who 
display overconfidence through their past tendency to make extreme forecasts.  In 
Figure 5, six-month to three-year rolling windows are used.  Take the one-year rolling 
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window: while the OS-R2 is close to zero, using 60-90% filters generates OS-R2s of 3.92-
4.43% which are statistically significant at less than 5%.  
 
5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
 
The ability to forecast market returns is critical for many decision-makers.  It matters for 
market timing, asset allocation, pension fund deficit calculation and corporate planning. 
While it is recognized that returns have at best a modest predictable component, any 
improvements that can be garnered over such naïve models as the short rate plus the 
average realized equity premium are without doubt worth pursuing.  Panels of expert 
forecasters are a ready source of informed opinion, but it is not clear how to make the 
best use of panel data. 
 
We have considered how overconfidence impacts forecast performance.  
Overconfidence as proxied by the tendency to make extreme forecasts leads to poor 
performance.  Further, controlling for the fact that good forecasters have some 
knowledge of their skill which causes them to generate more narrow confidence 
intervals, it is still true that overconfidence as proxied by the hit ratio (i.e., percentage of 
the time that an interval contains the eventual realization) is associated with poor 
performance.  It is beneficial to have information on the sources of forecast weakness 
because if one has such information but the forecaster under the microscope has an 
insufficient track record one can still make educated guesses about future performance.   
 
Given forecaster heterogeneity it is logical to explore whether filtering out weak 
forecasters is a viable strategy.  Filtering can be done directly by conditioning on past 
performance.  Particularly useful when performance information is sparse is the fact 
that conditioning can also be done indirectly by taking into account overconfidence 
markers.  Fairly short rolling windows, which delicately balance ignoring relevant 
information and noise reduction, work best.     
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TABLE 1: Sign expectations of determinants of MSPE 
 
This table presents sign expectations of determinants of MSPEs.  STALENESS_MEAN is 
the average number of days prior to the end of the survey month the forecaster in 
question submits his or her forecast.  CONF_INT_MEAN is defined as (U6-L6)/DAX0, or 
the difference between the six-month interval upper bound and lower bound deflated 
by the current level of the DAX.  SD is the standard deviation of point forecasts. 
EXPERIENCE is the overall number of forecasts submitted during the sample. 
EXPERIENCE_2 is EXPERIENCE squared.   
 
 
Independent variables Expected sign 
  
STALENESS_MEAN + 
  
CONF_INT_MEAN + 
  
SD  + 
  
EXPERIENCE - 
  
EXPERIENCE_2 + 
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TABLE 2: Cross-sectional MSPE regressions 
 
This table reports the estimated coefficients from the cross-sectional regressions of 
MSPE on various potential determinants.  The dependent variable is scaled by 104. 
STALENESS_MEAN is the average number of days prior to the end of the survey 
month the forecaster in question submits his or her forecast.  CONF_INT_MEAN is 
defined as the average of (U6-L6)/DAX0, the difference between the six-month interval 
upper bound and lower bound deflated by the current level of the DAX for each 
forecaster.  SD is the standard deviation of point forecasts over the sample. 
EXPERIENCE is the overall number of forecasts submitted during the sample. 
EXPERIENCE_2 is EXPERIENCE squared.  RELATIVE_IMPUTED_IND_VOL_MEAN is 
calculated in two steps (as in Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2013)).  First, for each 
forecaster in every survey month, we convert respondents’ confidence intervals into 
individual volatility estimates by using the Davidson and Cooper (1976) method to 
recover respondent-specific probability distributions under normality.  Second, we 
standardize them relative to all forecasters participating in the same survey month and 
then average across all months for which there was participation.  Panels A through D 
differ in the minimum number of forecasts that a forecaster must submit in order to 
remain in the sample, with minima of n=5, 10, 20, and 30, respectively. The t-statistics 
are reported below the coefficients and corrected for heteroscedasticity using the White 
(1980) correction.  Note that ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: At least 5 survey responses 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
    
STALENESS_MEAN 0.740*** 0.817*** 0.751*** 
 (4.274) (4.621) (4.473) 
CONF_INT_MEAN 30.769*** 28.518***  
 (2.979) (2.920)  
SD 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (2.830) (3.248) (3.253) 
EXPERIENCE -0.108*** -0.701*** -0.731*** 
 (-2.754) (-3.838) (-3.962) 
EXPERIENCE_2  0.006*** 0.006*** 
  (3.640) (3.765) 
RELATIVE_IMPUTED_IND_VOL_MEAN   2.766** 
   (2.409) 
Constant 7.585 16.659*** 23.776*** 
 (1.525) (3.013) (4.372) 
    
Observations 381 381 381 
Adj. R-squared 0.085 0.115 0.117 
    
 
22 
 
 Panel B: At least 10 survey responses 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
    
STALENESS_MEAN 0.619*** 0.685*** 0.634*** 
 (4.201) (4.689) (4.412) 
CONF_INT_MEAN 24.189*** 22.262**  
 (2.672) (2.570)  
SD 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (3.677) (3.987) (3.965) 
EXPERIENCE -0.094** -0.661*** -0.689*** 
 (-2.244) (-3.594) (-3.721) 
EXPERIENCE_2  0.005*** 0.006*** 
  (3.551) (3.687) 
RELATIVE_IMPUTED_IND_VOL_MEAN   2.043** 
   (2.261) 
Constant 8.227 17.373*** 23.142*** 
 (1.642) (3.276) (4.849) 
    
Observations 347 347 347 
Adj. R-squared 0.093 0.122 0.122 
    
Panel C: At least 20 survey responses 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
    
STALENESS_MEAN 0.621*** 0.724*** 0.687*** 
 (4.146) (4.735) (4.553) 
CONF_INT_MEAN 17.781** 16.699**  
 (2.051) (1.974)  
SD 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 (3.431) (3.670) (3.684) 
EXPERIENCE -0.080* -0.944*** -0.960*** 
 (-1.692) (-3.178) (-3.215) 
EXPERIENCE_2  0.008*** 0.008*** 
  (3.245) (3.285) 
RELATIVE_IMPUTED_IND_VOL_MEAN   1.518* 
   (1.852) 
Constant 8.018 25.912*** 29.883*** 
 (1.463) (3.266) (3.871) 
    
Observations 296 296 296 
Adj. R-squared 0.090 0.133 0.133 
    
 
 
 
23 
 
 Panel D: At least 30 survey responses 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
    
STALENESS_MEAN 0.613*** 0.647*** 0.610*** 
 (4.242) (4.350) (4.176) 
CONF_INT_MEAN 17.028** 16.188*  
 (1.972) (1.923)  
SD 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (3.612) (3.671) (3.706) 
EXPERIENCE 0.014 -0.380 -0.383 
 (0.306) (-0.951) (-0.961) 
EXPERIENCE_2  0.003 0.003 
  (1.063) (1.076) 
RELATIVE_IMPUTED_IND_VOL_MEAN   1.610** 
   (1.976) 
Constant 1.455 10.997 14.407 
 (0.270) (0.982) (1.293) 
    
Observations 264 264 264 
Adj. R-squared 0.123 0.125 0.130 
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TABLE 3: Hit percentages for MSPE groups 
 
This table investigates whether more overconfident forecasters have higher MSPEs. 
HIT_PERCENTAGE is defined as the percentage of the time one’s (imputed) one-month 
confidence interval contains the eventual value of the DAX, with lower values 
indicating higher overconfidence.  High, Medium, and Low groups based on MSPE are 
formed, with the High group containing the highest-MSPE forecasters and the Low 
group the lowest-MSPE forecasters.  The last column reports the difference in means 
between High and Low with a t-test for equality.  Note that ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Group based on MSPE 
 
Low Medium High Difference (High-Low) 
     
Panel A: At least 5 survey responses 
     
HIT_PERCENTAGE (%) 51.88 51.70 47.38 -4.50** 
     
Panel B: At least 10 survey responses 
     
HIT_PERCENTAGE (%) 52.54 50.78 48.49 -4.05* 
 
Panel C: At least 20 survey responses 
     
HIT_PERCENTAGE (%) 51.54 50.51 46.54 -5.00** 
     
Panel D: At least 30 survey responses 
     
HIT_PERCENTAGE (%) 51.96 49.49 48.79        -3.17 
     
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
25 
 
TABLE 4: Characteristics of filtered out forecasters 
 
This table investigates the characteristics of filtered out (ex post weaker) forecasters 
based on historical MSPE.  We employ the screen that at least five forecasts over the 
rolling window of six months must have been made.  We form Most, Between, and 
Least groups based on the percentage of the time that each forecaster is filtered out over 
the sample period, with the High group containing those filtered out most often.  The 
sample sizes for Least, Between, and Most are 126, 123, and 130, respectively. The last 
column reports the difference in means and medians of the characteristics of filtered out 
forecasters between Most and Least with both a t-test and a Wilcoxon Z-test for equality.  
Note that ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
 
Group based on percentage of time 
forecasters are filtered out 
 
 
Least Between Most Difference (Most-Least) 
      
STALENESS_MEAN Mean 20.957 21.711 21.760 0.803** 
 Median 20.146 21.226 20.988 0.841** 
      
CONF_INT_MEAN Mean 0.166 0.162 0.193 0.027** 
 Median 0.153 0.154 0.170 0.017*** 
      
SD Mean 1,194 1,302 1,293 99*** 
 Median 1,312 1,349 1,329 16** 
      
RELATIVE_IMPUTED_IND_VOL_MEAN Mean -0.107 -0.104 0.258 0.365*** 
 Median -0.204 -0.191 0.059 0.262*** 
      
26 
 
FIG
U
R
E 1: O
S-R
2s and p-values for one-year to three-year recursive screens 
This figure investigates w
hether filtering out w
eaker forecasters based on prior perform
ance (M
SPE) im
proves forecast 
com
bination accuracy.  This figure displays both O
S-R
2s and corresponding p-values for one-, tw
o- and three-year 
recursive w
indow
s.  For forecast evaluation, O
S-R
2 is calculated based on C
am
pbell and Thom
pson (2008).  This statistic 
gauges the proportional reduction in M
SPE for a com
peting m
odel relative to the historical average benchm
ark.  P-values 
are com
puted based on the M
SPE-adjusted statistic of C
lark and W
est (2007).  W
e em
ploy the screen that at least 10 
forecasts over the rolling w
indow
 m
ust have been m
ade.   
Panel A
: O
S-R
2s 
 
 
 
Panel B: P-values 
 
28 
 
FIG
U
R
E 2: O
S-R
2s and p-values for one-year to three-year rolling screens 
This figure investigates w
hether filtering out w
eaker forecasters based on prior perform
ance (M
SPE) im
proves forecast 
com
bination accuracy.  This figure displays both O
S-R
2s and corresponding p-values for one-, tw
o- and three-year rolling 
w
indow
s.  For forecast evaluation, O
S-R
2 is calculated based on C
am
pbell and Thom
pson (2008).  This statistic gauges the 
proportional reduction in M
SPE for a com
peting m
odel relative to the historical average benchm
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Panel B: P-values 
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FIG
U
R
E 3: O
S-R
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ent. 
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in_10_for_12) repeats the rolling one-year w
indow
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and one m
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in_1_for_1).  O
S-R
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Panel B: P-values 
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FIG
U
R
E 4: O
S-R
2s and p-values for short rolling screens (against 0%
 filter benchm
ark) 
This figure investigates the econom
ic significance of the forecast im
provem
ent by filtering out w
eaker forecasters based 
on prior perform
ance (M
SPE).  The sam
e four w
indow
s as in Figure 3 are used, but now
 the unfiltered m
ean forecast is 
the benchm
ark against w
hich w
e com
pare filtered m
ean forecasts.  
Panel A
: O
S-R
2s 
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Panel B: P-values 
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FIG
U
R
E 5: Filtering out forecasters based on SD
s  
This figure investigates w
hether filtering out forecasters based on SD
 im
proves forecast com
bination accuracy.  This 
figure displays both O
S-R
2s and corresponding p-values for six-m
onth, one-, tw
o- and three-year rolling w
indow
s.  Each 
forecaster’s SD
 is calculated over the rolling w
indow
.  W
e elim
inate the z%
 of forecasters w
hose prior SD
 falls in the top 
z%
 of all forecasters w
ho m
ake a forecast in a given m
onth.  W
e consider increm
ents of 10%
 (10-90%
) along w
ith 95%
, 
99%
 and “A
ll but best.”  O
S-R
2 is calculated based on C
am
pbell and Thom
pson (2008).  P-values are com
puted based on 
the M
SPE-adjusted statistic of C
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est (2007). 
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Panel B: P-values 
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